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PUBLIC LAW-ARKANSAS FREEDOM OF INFORMATION
ACT-WORKING PAPERS AND LITIGATION FILES OF ATTORNEYS HIRED
BY PUBLIC ENTITIES ARE SUBJECT TO DISCLOSURE. City of Fayetteville
v. Edmark, 304 Ark. 179, 801 S.W.2d 275 (1990).
Beginning in 1985, the City of Fayetteville (City), as part of the
Northwest Arkansas Resource Recovery Authority (Authority), took
steps to develop an incinerator and landfill.1 The City issued $22 mil-
lion in bonds to finance the project and contracted to have the incinera-
tor constructed.2 The bonds were issued without an election and were
unconditionally guaranteed by the City.3 Following the issuance of the
bonds, opposition to the project's cost and potential environmental im-
pact grew. In a nonbinding public referendum on March 8, 1988, vot-
ers rejected the project." The following day, the Authority canceled the
project in response to the opposition. 5" When it attempted to repay the
bondholders, the City discovered that it was $7 million short.6 The City
retained the McDermott, Will & Emery Law Firm (McDermott) of
Washington, D.C. and the Niblock Law Firm (Niblock) of Fayetteville
to handle the cancellation and repayment of the bonds and to prepare
for potential litigation.7 The City paid approximately $400,000 in pub-
lic funds to both firms for fees and expenses.8
On August 15, 1989, the City passed an ordinance raising sanita-
tion fees to cover the $7 million shortage.9 A lawsuit, Robson v. City of
Fayetteville,0 was filed in Washington County Chancery Court on Au-
gust 28, 1989, challenging the City's authority to guarantee the type of
bonds issued for the incineration project and seeking to invalidate the
ordinance which increased sanitation fees."
In anticipation of litigation, Niblock and McDermott created a
I. City of Fayetteville v. Edmark, 304 Ark. 179, 182, 801 S.W.2d 275, 276-77 (1990).









11. Id. This was referred to as the "incinerator litigation." Id.
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great number of documents analyzing potential legal issues and the
City's position.12 Dave Edmark and Donrey, Inc., d/b/a Springdale
News (Donrey), filed a request with the City under the Arkansas Free-
dom of Information Act (FOIA) 13 seeking disclosure of these legal
documents. 4
The City requested a protective order from the chancery court in
the Robson litigation to block Donrey's FOIA request, but the court
rejected the City's motion, holding that it lacked jurisdiction because
Donrey was not a party before the court. 15 The City did not appeal.' 6
The City next sued Donrey and others in the Chancery Court of
Washington County seeking a declaratory judgment that the docu-
ments were not subject to disclosure. The City's petition was denied on
the basis of lack of jurisdiction and no appeal was pursued.' 7
The Washington County prosecuting attorney issued a subpoena in
circuit court requesting that the documents be released. 18 In response
to the City's motion to quash the subpoena, the circuit court examined
the documents in camera and issued a protective order prohibiting the
prosecutor's office from releasing any of the documents. The court,
however, left open the question of whether Donrey might be able to
obtain the FOIA documents in the civil division.' 9
Following the issuance of the prosecutor's subpoena, Donrey re-
newed its FOIA request for the attorney's documents.20 When the City
refused to comply with Donrey's request, Donrey filed suit in Washing-
ton County Circuit Court.2 ' The City argued that the documents were
not subject to disclosure under the Act for the following reasons: 1) the
documents were not in the possession of the City; 2) the documents
were not "public documents" within the meaning of the Act; 3) the
documents were not subject to the Act because they would not help the
public in evaluating the performance of public officials; 4) the protec-
tive order in the criminal division fell into one of the Act's specific
exemptions from disclosure; and 5) the release of the documents would
12. Id.
13. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 25-19-101 to -107 (1987 & Supp. 1989).
14. 304 Ark. at 183, 801 S.W.2d at 277.
15. Id. at 179, 801 S.W.2d at 275.
16. Id. at 183, 801 S.W.2d at 277.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 183-84, 801 S.W.2d at 277.
19. Id.




violate the City's right to a fair trial in Robson.2 The circuit court
rejected the City's arguments." The circuit court further concluded
that it lacked jurisdiction to issue a protective order that would be
binding upon the Robson litigation in the chancery court,2 ' and ordered
that the documents be disclosed under the Act. 5
The City appealed the circuit court's order to the Arkansas Su-
preme Court. The court held: 1) the attorneys' documents were public
records in the possession of the City and subject to disclosure under the
Freedom of Information Act;26 2) the documents fell into none of the
existing disclosure exemptions;2 7 3) the creation or expansion of any
exemptions should be left to the legislature;28 and 4) the circuit court
lacked the jurisdictional authority to issue a protective order binding
upon the incinerator litigation in the chancery court.29 City of Fayette-
ville v. Edmark, 304 Ark. 179, 801 S.W.2d 275 (1990).
At common law the public did not have a general right to inspect
government records.30 The English courts eventually established a "liti-
gation interest" rule whereby persons needing information for use in
litigation were allowed some access."1 In the United States, the rule
grew to encompass inspection of records by one attempting to protect
the public interest.3 2 The typical situation involved a taxpayer exposing
the financial affairs of a governmental body or irregularities in official
conduct.33 Over time, some courts eliminated the public interest re-
quirement 4 and some states included the right to inspect public docu-
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 191, 801 S.W.2d at 281.
25. Id. at 184, 801 S.W.2d at 277.
26. Id. at 185-86, 801 S.W.2d at 278.
27. Id. at 189-90, 801 S.W.2d at 279-81.
28. Id. at 192, 801 S.W.2d at 282.
29. Id. at 191-92, 801 S.W.2d at 281.
30. Watkins, Access to Public Records under the Arkansas Freedom of Information Act,
37 ARK. L. REV. 741, 744 (citing H. CRoss, THE PEOPLE'S RIGHT TO KNOW (1953)). Professor
John J. Watkins, Professor of Law, University of Arkansas, B.J. 1970, M.A. 1971, J.D. 1976,
University of Texas, is the leading authority on the Arkansas Freedom of Information Act. His
1984 article has been favorably cited by the Arkansas Supreme Court in several FOIA decisions
and contains extensive information on the history and law of the records portion of the Act.
31. Watkins, supra note 30, at 744 (citing Rex v. Tower, 4 M & S 162, 105 Eng. Rep. 795
(1815); Rex v. Lucas, 10 East 235, 103 Eng. Rep. 765 (1808); Rex v. Allgood, 7 T.R. 746, 101
Eng. Rep. 1232 (1798)).
32. Watkins, supra note 30, at 744.
33. Watkins, supra note 30, at 744.
34. Burton v. Tuite, 78 Mich. 363, 44 N.W. 282 (1889); MacEwan v. Holm, 226 Or. 27,
359 P.2d 413 (1961).
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ments within their constitutions.35
Nevertheless, broad disclosure of public documents was the excep-
tion rather than the rule for several reasons. 36 First, the definition of
"public record" was narrow; therefore, many documents in the posses-
sion of public entities were not subject to inspection because the docu-
ments fell outside the definition.3 7 Secondly, the inspection could be
denied if the requester possessed an improper motive, such as idle curi-
osity, commercial gain, or malice.38 Thirdly, the appropriate remedy
for the denial of disclosure, a writ of mandamus, was considered discre-
tionary.3 9 Finally, inspection was often prohibited when disclosure
would be adverse to the public interest.40 In an effort to remove the
common-law restrictions and ensure public access to public records,
every state now has some form of open records statute.4 The United
35. LA. CONST. art. XII, § 3; N.D. CONST. art. XI, § 6.
36. Watkins, supra note 30, at 744-45.
37. Watkins, supra note 30, at 744-45. The definition of "public record" at common law
included only records required to be kept by state law. Watkins, supra note 30, at 745.
38. Watkins, supra note 30, at 744-45. Although some jurisdictions eliminated the "inter-
est" requirement, it remained the general rule at common law. Braverman & Heppler, A Practi-
cal Review of State Open Records Laws, 49 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 720, 723 (1981).
39. Watkins, supra note 30, at 744-45. In Arkansas the proper remedy was the writ of
mandamus. Bowden v. Webb, 116 Ark. 310, 173 S.W. 181 (1915). It was within the discretion of
the court to issue or withhold the writ. Patterson v. Collison, 135 Ark. 105, I1I, 204 S.W. 753,
754 (1918).
40. Watkins, supra note 30, at 744-45.
41. ALA. CODE § 36-12-40 (Supp. 1990); ALASKA STAT. § 09.25.110 (Supp. 1990); ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 39-121 (1985); ARK. CODE ANN. § 25-19-105 (Supp. 1990); CAL. GOV'T
CODE § 6253 (Deering Supp. 1991); COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-72-203 (1988); CONN. GEN. STAT. §
1-19 (1990); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 10003 (1990); FLA. STAT. § 119.07 (1990); GA. CODE
ANN. § 50-18-70 (1990); HAW. REV. STAT. § 92F-12 (1989); IDAHO CODE § 9-338 (1990); ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 116, §§ 43.4-.29, .101-.103a, .113 (1990); IND. CODE ANN. § 5-14-3-3 (Burns
1987); IOWA CODE § 22.2 (1989); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 45-218 (1986); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §
61.872 (Michie 1986); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44:31 (West 1982); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. I, §
408 (1989); MD. STAT GOV'T CODE ANN. § 10-612 (1984); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 66 § 10
(West 1988); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 15.233 (1981); MINN. STAT. § 13.03 (Supp. 1991); MISS.
CODE ANN. § 25-61-5 (Supp. 1990); Mo. REV. STAT. § 109.180 (1966); MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-6-
104 (1989); NEB. REv. STAT. § 84-712.01 (1987); NEV. REV. STAT. § 239.010 (1986); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 91-A:4 (1990); N.J. REV. STAT. § 47:1A2 (1989); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-1
(1988); N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 46-84 to -90 (McKinney Supp. 1991); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 132-6
(1986); N.D. CENT. CODE § 44-04-18 (1978); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 149.43 (Baldwin 1991);
OKLA. STAT. tit. 51, § 24A.5 (1988); OR. REV. STAT. § 192.420 (1985); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 65, §
66.2 (Purdon 1959); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 38-2-1 to -13 (1990); S.C. CODE ANN. § 30-4-30 (Law.
Co-op. Supp. 1989); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 1-27-1 (Supp. 1990); TENN. CODE ANN. § 10-7-503
(1987); TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. § 6252-17a (Vernon Supp. 1991); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-26-
2 (1977); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. I, § 316 (1985); VA. CODE ANN. § 2.1-342 (Supp. 1990); WASH.
REV. CODE §§ 42.17.260 to -310 (Supp. 1991); W. VA. CODE § 29B-1-3 (1986); WIS. STAT. §
19.35 (1986); WYO. STAT. § 92-407 (Supp. 1990).
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States Congress joined this movement, adopting the Federal Freedom
of Information Act in 1966.42
Arkansas courts were surprisingly liberal in allowing access to
public records despite the absence of any general statutory right of in-
spection.'3 In Collins v. State"" the court required disclosure of internal
audit records of the Pulaski County Sheriff concerning a deputy ac-
cused of embezzling public funds. 45 In Republican Party v. State ex
rel. Hall"6 the court required the state treasurer to disclose a list of
banks in which state money was deposited. In Hall the court specifi-
cally rejected the argument that there was no common-law right of
access to public documents.' 7 Most cases, though, dealt with election
records which were required by statute to be open for inspection.' 8
In 1968 Arkansas adopted the Freedom of Information Act,"9
which guarantees the public the right to inspect public documents. To
be subject to disclosure under the Act, the requested information must
be in the possession of an entity covered by the Act, fall within the
definition of "public records," and not be specifically exempted by stat-
42. Pub. L. No. 89-554, 80 Stat. 383 (1966) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552
(1988)).
43. J. WATKINS, THE ARKANSAS FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT 3 (1988).
44. 200 Ark. 1027, 143 S.W.2d 1 (1940).
45. Id. In making its ruling the court stated:
[l]t is a public document, paid for with public funds, and available to any citizen for
inspection at any reasonable time in the office of the circuit clerk ....
... To hold that when such information has been gathered, explained so convinc-
ingly that indictments for embezzlement are predicated upon its accuracy, and thereaf-
ter convictions are had-to say that the general welfare is best served by consigning to
oblivion the details . . . is to lose sight of the paramount interest so inconspicuously
represented by the humble taxpayer.
Id. at 1042-43, 143 S.W.2d at 8-9.
46. 240 Ark. 545, 400 S.W.2d 660 (1966).
47. Id. at 548-49, 400 S.W.2d at 662.
48. J. WATKINS, supra note 43, at 3. See Baker v. Boone, 230 Ark. 843, 327 S.W.2d 85
(1959); Brooks v. Pullen, 187 Ark. 80, 58 S.W.2d 682 (1933).
49. Watkins, supra note 30, at 752. Several events in the mid-1960s provided the impetus
for the adoption of the Arkansas Freedom of Information Act. There was a push by Arkansas
journalists to make government meetings and documents more accessible. Id. The Legislative
Council conducted studies comparing Arkansas laws with access statutes in other states. Id. Sev-
eral controversial closed meetings were held by public bodies. Id. The state Republican Party
attempted to obtain voting records under existing statutory law, but was continually required to go
to court in order to gain access to the records. Id. Winthrop Rockefeller was elected governor as a
Republican and lent his support to the Act. Id. Finally, several Arkansas Supreme Court deci-
sions, including Hall, required disclosure of public records. Id. All of these factors combined to
provide the political base for the FOIA's passage in 1967. Id.
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ute.50 If a record is a "public record" under the FOIA, it must be dis-
closed unless there is a specific statutory exemption-either in the Act
or elsewhere in Arkansas statutory law. 1
The Arkansas Supreme Court first interpreted the Act in Laman
v. McCord" and held that the Act is to be broadly and liberally con-
strued in favor of disclosure while exemptions are to be narrowly con-
strued.58 In Laman two newspaper editors alleged that a closed session
of the North Little Rock City Council violated the Act.54 In finding for
the newspaper editors, the court held that the Act was enacted for the
benefit of the public and, therefore, should be construed in favor of the
public. 5 The court noted that the legislative intent was included in the
Act:56 "It is vital in a democratic society that public business be per-
formed in an open and public manner."5 The court stated that the
language of the Act "was so clear, so positive, that there is hardly any
need for interpretation."5
In 1973 the Arkansas Supreme Court sharply narrowed the scope
of the Act by limiting the definition of "public records" under the Act.
In McMahan v. Board of Trustees of the University of Arkansas9 the
court held that lists of persons receiving complimentary University of
Arkansas football tickets were not public records as defined by the
Act.60 The court focused on the statutory language in the Act mandat-
ing disclosure of records, "which by law are required to be kept and
50. Legislative Joint Auditing Comm. v. Woosley, 291 Ark. 89, 90, 722 S.W.2d 581, 582
(1987) (citing Watkins, supra note 30, at 741 (1984)).
51. ARK. CODE ANN. § 25-19-105 (Supp. 1989). See, e.g., Legislative Joint Auditing
Comm. v. Woosley, 291 Ark. 89, 722 S.W.2d 581 (1987); Ragland v. Yeargan, 288 Ark. 81, 702
S.W.2d 23 (1986) (corporate and business motor fuel tax records were not specifically exempted
by either the FOJA or the Tax Procedure Act, codified at ARK. CODE ANN. § 26-18-303 (1987)).
52. 245 Ark. 401, 432 S.W.2d 753 (1968).
53. See, e.g., Arkansas Gazette Co. v. Southern State College, 273 Ark. 248, 250, 620
S.W.2d 258, 259-60 (1981), appeal dismissed, 455 U.S. 931 (1982); North Cent. Assoc. of Col-
leges & Schools v. Troutt Bros., Inc., 261 Ark. 378, 548 S.W.2d 825, 826 (1977); Arkansas
Gazette Co. v. Pickens, 258 Ark. 69, 522 S.W.2d 350, 352 (1975).
54. 245 Ark. 401, 432 S.W.2d 753 (1968). Ironically, Laman addressed the same question
at issue in Edmark because the closed meeting was with the city attorney. The court was faced
with deciding whether the attorney-client privilege could be used to pre-empt the Act. Id. at 405-
06, 432 S.W.2d at 755-56.
55. Id. at 404, 432 S.W.2d at 755.
56. ARK. CODE ANN. § 25-19-102 (1987).
57. 245 Ark. 404, 432 S.W.2d at 755.
58. Id.
59. 255 Ark. 108, 499 S.W.2d 56 (1973).
60. Id.
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maintained,"'" and concluded that public records were only those re-
quired to be kept in the course of a public entity's official duties.6" The
legislature responded to the court's decision in McMahan by adding
the language "or otherwise kept" to the Act's definition of "public
record."'6
Presently, the Act's definition of "public record" is very broad and
comprehensive, as is the scope of who may be compelled to disclose
information.6' Any agency supported by or receiving public funds is
subject to the Act. The Act provides that "public records" include
records maintained by "a public official or employee, a governmental
agency, or any other agency wholly or partially supported by public
funds or expending public funds." 65 This public funding definition of
"public records" makes the Act applicable to even the most obscure
public agency. 66 As a result, the Arkansas Supreme Court has found
that the Act applies to otherwise seemingly private organizations that
receive some public funding.6"
Although the Arkansas Supreme Court has indicated that the
61. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 12-2803 (1968), as amended by Act 652 of 1977 and Act 49 of
1987, codified at ARK. CODE ANN. § 25-19-103 (Supp. 1989)).
62. 255 Ark. at l10-11, 499 S.W.2d at 56.
63. Act 652 of 1977, ARK. CODE ANN. § 25-19-103 (1987). Act 652 amended the definition
of public record to read as follows:
"Public records" means writings, recorded sounds, films, tapes, or data compilations in
any form, required by law to be kept or otherwise kept, and which constitute a record
of the performance or lack of performance of official functions which are or should be
carried out by a public official or employee, a governmental agency, or any other
agency wholly or partially supported by public funds or expending public funds. All
records maintained in public offices or by public employees within the scope of their
employment shall be presumed to be public records.
Id. (emphasis added).
The records portion of the FOIA was also amended by Act 49 of 1987, which clarified
whether and when personnel records should be subject to disclosure. In 1989 the Act was
amended by Act 8 of the Third Extraordinary Session of 1989, which provided a new exemption
for records of the Arkansas Industrial Development Commission.
64. Watkins, supra note 30, at 763.
65. ARK. CODE ANN. § 25-19-103 (1987).
66. Watkins, supra note 30, at 763-64.
67. See, e.g., Depoyster v. Cole, 298 Ark. 203, 766 S.W.2d 606 (1989) (a voluntary associa-
tion to regulate extracurricular athletic activities of secondary schools was subject to the Act);
Arkansas Gazette Co. v. Southern State College, 273 Ark. 248, 620 S.W.2d 258 (1981), appeal
dismissed, 455 U.S. 931 (1982) (an athletic conference was subject to the FOIA because some
funds that it received from members were public funds); North Cent. Assoc. of Colleges &
Schools v. Troutt Bros., Inc., 261 Ark. 378, 548 S.W.2d 825 (1977) (a voluntary organization of
colleges and secondary schools was subject to the FOIA because it was supported by contributions
from members, some of whom were publicly funded).
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mere receipt of public money by an entity will cause the entity to be-
come subject to the Act, there is some question regarding this proposi-
tion. 8 It is unlikely that the legislature intended that the receipt of
public money, regardless of the contribution's size or purpose, would
automatically make an entity subject to the Act. 9 The Act's declara-
tion that "public business be performed in an open and public man-
ner" 70 is consistent with this view. A 1983 Arkansas Attorney Gen-
eral's opinion concluded that the mere receipt of Medicare funds did
not make a privately owned hospital subject to the Act."' Even in situa-
tions where the public funding provision was used to encompass seem-
ingly private entities, it can be argued that the entities acted on behalf
of the public. 72 Therefore, the court's language can be seen as simply
making clear that public entities cannot avoid disclosure by "farming
out" their duties and that private entities performing public functions
will be subject to the Act. 73
Another aspect of the Act's definition of "public records" is its
requirement that documents "constitute a record of the performance or
lack of performance of official functions. ' 74 Although this wording has
the potential to limit disclosure under the Act, the relationship between
the record and official duties is easy to establish. 75 For example, ballots
used in selecting the sites of the state high school basketball tourna-
ment have been found to be public records. 6 Private papers left at the
scene of a murder-suicide have also been found to be records of per-
formance.77 Records of the amount of athletic scholarship awards to
student athletes have been found to be within the "performance" lan-
guage, as well. 78
68. Watkins, supra note 30, at 767.
69. Watkins, supra note 30, at 767.
70. ARK. CODE ANN. § 25-19-102 (1987).
71. 83 Op. Ark. Att'y Gen. 163 (1983).
72. E.g., Arkansas Gazette Co. v. Southern State College, 273 Ark. 248, 620 S.W.2d 258
(1981), appeal dismissed, 455 U.S. 931 (1982) (faculty members participated in athletic confer-
ence meetings in their capacity as state employees).
73. Watkins, supra note 30, at 767-68. If a public entity hires an accountant to conduct an
audit, the accountant's records which are relevant to the audit are subject to the FOIA while
other files not relating to the work performed for the public entity would remain out of reach.
Watkins, supra note 30, at 768-69.
74. ARK. CODE. ANN. § 25-19-103 (1987).
75. Watkins, supra note 30, at 776.
76. Depoyster v. Cole, 298 Ark. 203, 766 S.W.2d 606 (1989).
77. McCambridge v. City of Little Rock, 298 Ark. 219, 766 S.W.2d 909 (1989) (the papers
could be used to evaluate the performance of the police in their investigation).
78. Arkansas Gazette Co. v. Southern State College, 273 Ark. 248, 620 S.W.2d 258 (1981),
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In Arkansas Gazette Co. v. Pickens79 the court was confronted
with the issue of whether the Act placed any limits on who is entitled
to access to public records. Under the Act, "[e]xcept as otherwise spe-
cifically provided by this section or by laws specifically enacted to pro-
vide otherwise, all public records shall be open to inspection and copy-
ing by any citizen of the State of Arkansas." 80 The court indicated that
it would not allow the citizen requirement under the Act to block ac-
cess by corporations. 81 The court again considered the question of who
may obtain access under the Act in Arkansas Highway & Transporta-
tion Department v. Hope Brick Works, Inc.82 The court's language in
Hope Brick Works suggests that the court interpreted Pickens to mean
that anyone could obtain access under the Act.83
The Act provides a laundry list of exemptions which are not sub-
ject to disclosure, including working papers of judges and some state
officials, documents protected by court order, and files that would ad-
vantage "competitors." 84 However, as previously mentioned, in Laman
appeal dismissed, 455 U.S. 931 (1982).
79. 258 Ark. 69, 522 S.W.2d 350 (1975).
80. ARK. CODE ANN. § 25-19-105 (Supp. 1989).
81. 258 Ark. at 77-78, 522 S.W.2d at 355. In Pickens the requesting corporation was a
newspaper and there was no showing that the individual reporter making the request was a citizen
of Arkansas. Id. The court pointed to the vital role of the press in providing information to the
public in providing support for its holding that members of the news media are interested parties.
Id.
82. 294 Ark. 490, 744 S.W.2d 711 (1988).
83. Id. at 495-96, 522 S.W.2d at 712.
84. Section 4 of the Act, codified at ARK. CODE ANN. § 25-19-105(b) (Advance Code Supp.
1991) provides the following exemptions:
(I) State income tax records;
(2) Medical records, scholastic records, and adoption records;
(3) The site files and records maintained by the Arkansas Historic Preservation Pro-
gram and the Arkansas Archaeological Survey;
(4) Grand jury minutes;
(5) Unpublished drafts of judicial or quasi-judicial opinions and decisions;
(6) Undisclosed investigations by law enforcement agencies of suspected criminal
activity;
(7) Unpublished memoranda, working papers, and correspondence of the Governor,
members of the General Assembly, Supreme Court Justices, and the Attorney General;
(8) Documents which are protected from disclosure by order or rule of court;
(9)(A) Files which, if disclosed, would give advantage to competitors or bidders; and
(B) Records maintained by the Arkansas Industrial Development Commission related
to any business entity's planning, site location, expansion, operations, or product devel-
opment/marketing . . . and
(10) Personnel records to the extent that disclosure would constitute a clearly unwar-
ranted invasion of personal privacy.
1991]
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the court held that in order to facilitate the Act's stated purpose of
requiring disclosure, the statutory exemptions must be specifically pro-
vided and narrowly construed. 8 In rejecting the argument that the at-
torney-client privilege qualified as an exemption under the Act, the
court relied on language in the Act requiring open meetings "except as
otherwise specifically provided by law," '" and focused on the word
"specifically." 8 The court feared that an exemption based upon the
privilege would swallow the entire Act.88 The court has continued to
narrowly construe any exemption. 89
The degree to which the court strictly construes the exemptions is
illustrated by the court's decision in City of Fayetteville v. Rose.90 In
Rose a defendant indicted by a federal grand jury for manufacturing
and possessing explosive devices sought disclosure of the police investi-
gation files.9 ' The Act provides an exemption for "undisclosed investi-
gations by law enforcement agencies," but the court held that once the
investigation was completed and the grand jury had indicted Rose, the
police records were no longer exempt from disclosure. 92
Although the court in Laman held that the attorney-client privi-
lege did not provide an exemption under the Act, this doctrine has his-
torically protected some communications between an attorney and cli-
ent.93 The privilege may have originated at Roman law. 94 In England
the justification for the privilege was initially based on the loyalty that
85. Laman v. McCord, 245 Ark. 401, 404-06, 432 S.W.2d 753, 755-56 (1968).
86. ARK. CODE ANN. § 25-19-106 (1987).
87. 245 Ark. at 405-06, 432 S.W.2d at 755-56.
88. Id. at 406, 432 S.W.2d at 756. The court stated:
On the one hand, to deny to the city council the right to meet in secret with the city
attorney might in some instances work to the public disadvantage. But, on the other
hand, to allow the council to go into executive session at any time, upon the pretext of
consulting the city attorney about legal matters, might readily open the door to re-
peated and undetectable evasions of the Freedom of Information Act-also to the pub-
lic disadvantage.
Id.
89. See Legislative Joint Auditing Comm. v. Woosley, 291 Ark. 89, 126 S.W.2d 581 (1987)
(the exemption for the working papers of members of the General Assembly did not extend to
legislative committees); see also ARK. CODE ANN. § 25-19-105(b)(7) (Supp. 1989).
90. 294 Ark. at 468, 743 S.W.2d 817 (1988).
91. Id. The city argued that the police records were exempt from disclosure pursuant to
ARK. CODE ANN. § 25-19-105(b)(6) (Supp. 1989), which protects undisclosed criminal investiga-
tions. Id.
92. Id.
93. E. CLEARY. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 89 (3d ed. 1984).
94. E. CLEARY, supra note 93, at § 87.
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a lawyer owed his client 5 As the privilege evolved, the need to pro-
mote full disclosure between the client and attorney became the reason
for the privilege."6 If clients fully informed their attorneys, then the
attorneys could efficiently handle the litigation to reach a just solu-
tion.97 Although the attorney-client privilege is well-founded in the ad-
versarial system, it is not an absolute privilege. Because the privilege is
likely to exclude competent, accurate evidence, it has been held that
the privilege "ought to be strictly confined within the narrowest possi-
ble limits consistent with the logic of the principle."'" The Arkansas
Supreme Court has said:
This protection extends to every communication which the client
makes to his legal adviser, for the purpose of professional advice or
aid, upon the subject of his rights and liabilities. Nor is it necessary
that any judicial proceedings in particular should have been com-
menced or contemplated; it is enough if the matter in hand, like every
other human transaction, may by possibility become the subject of
judicial enquiry. The great object of the rule seems plainly to require
that the entire professional intercourse between client and attorney,
whatever it may have consisted in should be protected by profound
secrecy."
The privilege applies to corporate as well as individual clients. 100
Uniform Rule of Evidence 502 includes public officials and organiza-
tions within its definition of "client" under the privilege."'
The work-product doctrine, which can also be used by an attorney
to protect confidentiality, prevents discovery of an attorney's files and
mental impressions. 10 This protection is much broader than that pro-
vided by the attorney-client privilege since it extends to communica-
95. E. CLEARY, supra note 93, at § 87.
96. E. CLEARY, supra note 93, at § 87; 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON
LAW § 2291 (1961).
97. E. CLEARY, supra note 93, at § 87.
98. J. WIGMORE, supra note 96, § 2291, at 554.
99. Bobo v. Bryson, 21 Ark. 387, 388-89 (1860) (quoted in Laman v. McCord, 245 Ark.
401, 407-08, 432 S.W.2d 753, 756-57 (1968) (Fogleman, J., concurring)).
100. Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Ass'n, 320 F.2d 314 (7th Cir. 1963), cert.
denied, 375 U.S. 921 (1963).
101. UNIF. R. EvID. 502 (1974).
102. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947). The court's decision was later codified in
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3). NEWBERN, ARKANSAS CIVIL PROCEDURE AND PRACTICE § 17-2 (1985).
The Arkansas Supreme Court followed Hickman in Dritt v. Morris, 235 Ark. 40, 357 S.W.2d 13
(1962). In 1979 Arkansas adopted the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure, codifying Hickman.
NEWBERN. ARKANSAS CIVIL PROCEDURE AND PRACTICE § 17-2 (1985).
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tions from third parties in addition to those of the client. 03 Until the
promulgation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and their discov-
ery provisions, 04 the work-product doctrine had little significance be-
cause there were no practical means for invading a litigating party's
files and strategies. 0 5
The work-product doctrine differs from the attorney-client privi-
lege in many ways. The rationale for the work-product doctrine, unlike
the attorney-client privilege, is to maintain the integrity of the adver-
sarial system. 10 6 The doctrine may be claimed by either the attorney or
the client.10 7 Another difference is that disclosure to a third party does
not necessarily waive the work-product doctrine. 0 8 Work-product in
the form of mental impressions, conclusions, memos, and strategies is
given special protection. 09 The Eighth Circuit has held "opinion"
work-product to be protected as a general rule," 0 although extraordi-
nary circumstances might justify disclosure."'
The court in Laman rejected the argument that the attorney-client
privilege creates an exemption under the Act." 2 The court reasoned
that the attorney-client privilege 3 was a testimonial privilege directed
at communications within the context of litigation and, therefore, was
not a "specific" exemption from the Act." 4 In a concurring opinion,
Justice Fogleman took exception with the court's limited view of the
attorney-client privilege, but agreed that the codification of the privi-
lege did not create a "specific" statutory exemption to the Act."81
103. NEWBERN, supra note 102, § 17-2.
104. FED. R. Civ. P. 26-37.
105. Smith, The Work Product Doctrine: Its Origin, Evolution and Status in Modern Prac-
tice, 33 S.D.L. REV. 224, 224-25 (1988).
106. J. MOORE, J. LUCAS, & C. GROTHEER, 4 MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 26.64[4], 26-
389 (1989); Scourtes v. Fred W. Albrecht Grocery Co., 15 F.R.D. 55, 58 (N.D. Ohio 1953).
107. MOORE, supra note 106, at 11 26.64[4].
108. MOORE, supra note 106, at 26.64[4].
109. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
110. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 473 F.2d 840 (8th Cir. 1973).
Ill. In re Murphy, 560 F.2d 326 (8th Cir. 1977) (attorney required to submit documents
for judicial inspection). If the work product is at issue, it is not protected. MOORE, supra note 106,
at 26.64[3.-2].
112. 245 Ark. 401, 432 S.W.2d 753 (1968).
113. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 28-601 (1962) (repealed by Act 1143 of 1976 (Extended Session)).
114. 245 Ark. at 406, 432 S.W.2d at 755-56. In the majority's view, the privilege provided
only that an attorney could not testify in a court about client confidences. Because the privilege
extended only to disclosure sought in court, the court reasoned that the privilege was not a specific
exemption under the FOIA that would prevent disclosure outside the courtroom. Id.
115. Id. at 407-08, 432 S.W.2d at 756-57 (Fogleman, J., concurring). Justice Fogleman
argued that the majority took too narrow a view of the privilege. He focused on the historical
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Although Laman dealt with open meetings, the court applied the
same logic to claims of exemptions from the open records provisions in
Scott v. Smith" 6 and the court again held that the attorney-client priv-
ilege was not an exception to the Act. 117 In Scott a request was made
to examine the documents of a state agency's general counsel." 6 The
agency had forwarded some of the documents to an assistant attorney
general. 1 9 The trial court ruled that a letter, a memorandum, and trial
notes of the assistant attorney general were covered by the Act's spe-
cific statutory exemption for "[u]npublished memoranda, working pa-
pers and correspondence"' 20 of the attorney general. However, the trial
court ordered the disclosure of agency records that were in the posses-
sion of the agency's counsel and the assistant attorney general.' 2 ' In
affirming the trial court's decision, the supreme court said, "Unlike the
Freedom of Information Act, the attorney-client privilege has been nar-
rowly construed since it prevents the dissemination of truthful informa-
tion."' 22 The court concluded that the attorney-client privilege13 is an
evidentiary rule limited to court proceedings 2 ' and decided that there
had been no changes in the privilege in the nineteen years since Laman
that would create a specific exemption to the Act.'25
The Freedom of Information Act exempts the working papers of
the governor, state legislators, the attorney general, and supreme court
justices. 26 However, in Legislative Joint Auditing Committee v. Woos-
ley' 127 the court held that the working papers of auditors employed by
the Legislative Joint Auditing Committee were not covered by the
importance of the attorney-client privilege and its necessity in the adversarial system. Even so,
Justice Fogleman noted that the attorney-client statute protected only disclosure of the subject
matter of conferences, but did not specifically provide for the right of public entities to hold such
conferences in private. Id.
116. 292 Ark. 174, 728 S.W.2d 515 (1987).
117. Id. at 175-76, 801 S.W.2d at 515-16.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. ARK. CODE ANN. § 25-19-105 (1987).
121. 292 Ark. at 175, 728 S.W.2d at 515.
122. Id. at 176, 728 S.W.2d at 515 (citing Vittitow v. Burnett, 1] 2 Ark. 277, 165 S.W. 625
(1914)).
123. ARK. R. EvID. 502. Compare Laman v. McCord, 245 Ark. 401, 432 S.W.2d 753
(1968) with Scott v. Smith, 292 Ark. 174, 728 S.W.2d 515 (1987). The court's treatment of the
privilege in each case is identical.
124. 292 Ark. at 176, 728 S.W.2d at 515.
125. Id.
126. ARK. CODE ANN. § 25-19-105(b)(7) (Supp. 1989).
127. 291 Ark. 89, 722 S.W.2d 581 (1987).
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"working papers" exemption. 128 Woosley indicated that the working
papers exemption applied only to the officials themselves.1"9
In Scott, in addition to rejecting the attorney-client privilege as an
exemption, the court also held that the work-product doctrine shield
from discovery was not a statutory exemption within the meaning of
the Act.' The court found that the work-product limitation on the
scope of discovery, 131 like the attorney-client privilege, did not specifi-
cally apply under the Act.' 3 '
Similarly, in Hope Brick Works, Inc."sa the court rejected the
State's argument that the highway department's real estate appraisals
in the hands of state attorneys are protected by a work-product exemp-
tion or by attorney-client privilege. The court based its analysis on the
decision in Scott v. Smith"' and stated:
[W]e specifically rejected the argument for reversal that the court
erred in holding that the Freedom of Information Act applied to liti-
gation files maintained by attorneys representing state agencies. Re-
fusing to create an exemption or exception to the Freedom of Infor-
mation Act based upon the attorney-client relationship, we pointed
out that the attorney-client privilege was not one of the Act's
exceptions. 1 5
Therefore, while the working papers of the listed officials are exempted
from disclosure under the Act, the working papers of state agencies,
128. Id. In making its ruling the court stated: "The working papers of an auditor who is a
state employee cannot be deemed the private papers of individual legislators without completely
disregarding the plain and simple language of the FOIA. The act does not exempt working papers
of employees of a legislative committee, only those of the legislators." Id. at 92, 722 S.W.2d at
383.
129. WATKINS, supra note 43, at 75.
130. 292 Ark. 174, 728 S.W.2d 515. ARK. R. Civ. PRo. 26(b)(3) protects an attorney's
work product from discovery in the course of civil litigation. Referring to Rule 26, the court
stated:
[Rule 26] is a procedural rule limited to discovery. Neither [the attorney-client privi-
lege evidentiary rule] nor ARCP Rule 26(b)(3) specifically provides that it should have
application outside of these limited areas, and we have previously held that a statute
dealing with admission of evidence and discovery should not create a specific exception
to the Freedom of Information Act.
Id. at 176, 728 S.W.2d at 515-16 (citing Baxter County Newspapers, Inc. v. Medical Staff of
Baxter Gen. Hosp., 273 Ark. 511, 622 S.W.2d 495 (1981)).
131. ARK. R. Civ. PRO. 26(b)(3).
132. 292 Ark. at 176, 728 S.W.2d at 515-16.
133. 294 Ark. 490, 744 S.W.2d 711 (1988).
134. 292 Ark. 174, 728 S.W.2d 515 (1987).
135. 294 Ark. at 495, 744 S.W.2d at 714.
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city and county officials, or anyone else, are not exempted. 136
The Act exempts documents protected from disclosure by order or
rule of the court.'37 In Arkansas Newspaper, Inc. v. Patterson'3 8 a
newspaper sought access to closed hearings and a sealed motion in a
trial where a 15-year-old boy was charged with capital murder. Though
the court was not required to rule because the trial had ended by the
time the FOIA request came before it, the court stated that "the Free-
dom of Information Act specifically provides that documents which are
protected from disclosure by order or rule of court are not required to
be open for inspection and copying."1 39 Given the Act's exemption and
the holding in Patterson, a court is free to ensure the integrity of its
proceedings by issuing orders preventing disclosure when necessary.
Without the exemption for judicial orders, the Act might be unconsti-
tutional with regard to its impact on court proceedings. 140
In City of Fayetteville v. Edmark'" the court began its analysis
by considering the legislature's intent that the public be fully apprised
of the conduct of public business.1 2 The court focused on the holding
in Laman, that the "Freedom of Information Act was passed wholly in
the public interest and is to be liberally interpreted to the end that its
praiseworthy purposes may be achieved,"' 4 and stated that the issues
must be viewed in this light."4 '
First, the court concluded that the attorneys' files were public
records within the meaning of the Act.14 The court reviewed the pa-
pers in question and concluded that, because they concerned the propri-
ety of the City's actions throughout the bond issue, the documents
clearly could be used to evaluate the performance of city officials." 6
136, WATKINS, supra note 43, at 75.
137. ARK. CODE ANN. § 25-19-105(b)(8) (Supp. 1989).
138. 281 Ark. 213, 662 S.W.2d 826 (1984).
139. Id. at 215, 662 S.W.2d at 827.
140. WATKINS, supra note 43, at 77.
141. 304 Ark. 179, 801 S.W.2d 275 (1990).
142. Id. at 184, 801 S.W.2d at 277-78 (citing ARK. CODE ANN. § 25-19-102). The court
used Laman as the "benchmark for the interpretation of the intent of the FOIA." 304 Ark. at
184, 801 S.W.2d at 278.
143. Id. at 184-85, 801 S.W.2d at 278 (quoting Laman v. McCord, 245 Ark. 401, 404, 432
S.W.2d 753, 755 (1968)).
144. 304 Ark. at 185, 801 S.W.2d at 278.
145. Id. at 185-86, 801 S.W.2d at 278.
146. Id. at 186, 801 S.W.2d at 278. The City conceded that the documents would be sub-




The court relied on Scott for the proposition that even litigation files
are subject to disclosure under the Act, noting that there is no exemp-
tion for attorney-client privilege or attorney work-product.Il
Second, the court rejected the City's claim that the documents
were not in the City's possession and, therefore, not subject to the
Act."" The court stated, "The FOIA requirements cannot be circum-
vented by delegation of regular duties to one specially retained to per-
form the same task as the regular employee or official."' 9 The court
noted that the City had paid $400,000 in legal fees to the outside attor-
neys and concluded that this also placed the documents within the defi-
nition of "public records." The court, however, did not expressly iden-
tify the link with the "public funding" provision in the Act's definition
of "public records.' 50
Third, after the court determined that the documents were indeed
public records within the Act, it found that the records did not fall into
any of the statutory exemptions provided by the Act.' 5' The City
claimed that the documents were subject to the protective order issued
in connection with the prosecutor's subpoena, and therefore exempt."5 2
The court rejected this argument because the order did not, nor was it
intended to, protect the documents from FOIA disclosure.6 3
The City also argued that the files should be shielded under the
specific exemption protecting information that gives an advantage to
competitors or bidders.1 4 The court concluded that the public is not a
"competitor" within the meaning of the statute.' 55 The court noted that
the public is composed of both those who agree and those who disagree
with a particular government action, and that the Act's definition of
"public" is to be construed broadly. 6  In the court's view, excluding
147. Id.
148. Id. at 186-87, 801 S.W.2d at 279.
149. Id. at 187, 801 S.W.2d at 279. "When the state or a political subdivision thereof seeks
to conduct its affairs through private entities, it seems clear that those entities are for all practical
purposes the government itself." Id. (quoting Watkins, supra note 30, at 764).
150. Id. at 187, 801 S.W.2d at 279. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 25-19-103 (1987).
151. 304 Ark. at 189-90, 801 S.W.2d at 279-81.
152. Id. at 189, 801 S.W.2d at 280-81.
153. Id., 801 S.W.2d at 280. The court quoted the City counsel as conceding: "Judge Gib-
son said that he was not foreclosing the Springdale News from seeking their civil remedy." Id. at
189, 801 S.W.2d at 280. The court also noted that the City had not appealed the two earlier
attempts to block access to the documents. Id. at 189-90, 801 S.W.2d at 280.
154. Id. at 190, 801 S.W.2d at 280.
155. Id., 801 S.W.2d at 281.
156. Id. (citing Arkansas Gazette Co. v. Pickens, 258 Ark. 69, 522 S.W.2d 350 (1975)).
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adverse litigants from access to public documents would be tantamount
to creating a new exemption-something the court has repeatedly indi-
cated that it would not do. 67 Furthermore, the court concluded that
the increased risk that the City would lose the challenge to the bond
issue in Robson did not justify creating a new exemption by judicial
fiat.158
Fourth, the City further argued that the circuit court erred in
holding that it did not have jurisdiction to enter an order to protect the
Robson proceedings in the chancery court.'6 9 The supreme court also
rejected this argument. 60 Although it recognized a court's power to
ensure the integrity of its own proceedings, the supreme court held that
the Act did not confer the power upon the circuit court to issue an
order binding upon the proceedings in the chancery court."' If the
chancery court had issued the protective order, the circuit court appar-
ently would have been bound by it in considering the FOIA request.
The circuit court, however, did not have jurisdiction to issue the protec-
tive order for proceedings in the chancery court.'62 The court stated
that the documents would not have been appropriate for a protective
order in any event because of their relationship to the public interest.16 3
The court ended its opinion with a discussion of some of the policy
considerations of the Act. The court took the position that creating an
exemption for legal work-product was a task for the legislature, not the
court. 6 4 The court pointed out that the working papers of some public
officials are exempt from disclosure, but city attorneys and attorneys
for state agencies are not included in the exemption.'1 5 If there are
problems due to the narrow scope of the exemptions, it is up to the
legislature, not the court, to correct them.
In addressing the argument that disclosure denied the City the
right to a fair trial, the court concluded that "[e]nhanced risk of losing
a trial does not equate to not getting a fair trial, but is a policy decision
157. Id. at 190, 801 S.W.2d at 281.
158. Id. at 192795, 801 S.W.2d at 282-83.
159. Id. at 191, 801 S.W.2d at 281.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 191.
162. Id. at 191-92, 801 S.W.2d at 281-82.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 192, 801 S.W,2d at 282.
165. Id. at 192, 801 S.W.2d at 282. The working papers of only the governor, legislators,
supreme court justices, and the attorney general are exempt from disclosure. Legislative Joint
Auditing Comm. v. Woosley, 291 Ark. 89, 722 S.W.2d 581 (1987).
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for the legislature."10 6 The court balanced the City's interest in the liti-
gation against the public's interest in disclosure. 67 The court concluded
that the rules of evidence and procedure and the trial court's discretion
in controlling its proceedings were sufficient to protect the City's right
to a fair trial. "
In a concurring and dissenting opinion, Justice Turner accepted
the court's outcome but argued that there is a need to apply the attor-
ney-client privilege in some instances where the client is a public en-
tity.'69 Turner argued that "purely legal memoranda-the work-prod-
uct of a retained attorney that remains in the exclusive possession of
the attorney and that had not been previously furnished to the public
agency[-]" should not be subject to disclosure under the Act. 170
In Edmark the court made it clear that neither the attorney-client
privilege nor the work-product doctrine will provide protection for a
public attorney's files. The Freedom of Information Act trumps them
both. "Thus, a government attorney lives in something of a glass house
as far as his work product and client communications are con-
cerned."'17 The Act provides access to his files for opponents, while the
attorney-client privilege and the work-product doctrine shield the oppo-
nents' files.
The court's rejection of the work-product doctrine is probably
more significant than its rejection of the attorney-client privilege. The
concerns voiced by Justice Fogleman in Laman and Justice Turner in
Edmark seem to have more to do with work-product than attorney-
client communications. The justification for the work-product doctrine
is to maintain the integrity of the adversarial system, and the fact that
a client is a public entity makes its rationale no less compelling.
On the other hand, there are several reasons why the attorney-
client privilege should not be applied to public entities. First, because
the privilege belongs to the client (i.e., the entity), it does not provide
the incentive for disclosure which is its justification. Employees would
166. 304 Ark. at 193, 801 S.W.2d at 282.
167. Id. at 193-94, 801 S.W.2d at 282-83. The court noted that it had recently been re-
quired to balance the constitutional right of privacy with the public's right to know. Id. at 194,
801 S.W.2d at 283 (citing McCambridge v. City of Little Rock, 298 Ark. 219, 766 S.W.2d 909
(1989) (balancing a citizen's constitutional right to privacy against the public interest in disclos-
ure of private documents at a crime 'scene)).
168. Id. at 194, 801 S.W.2d at 283.
169. Id. at 195, 801 S.W.2d at 283-84.
170. Id. (Turner, J. concurring and dissenting).
171. WATKINS, supra note 43, at 76.
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not be protected as individuals, so they would have little additional in-
centive to make full disclosure to the government attorney. Second, the
government employee's incentive to make full disclosure to the govern-
ment attorney is also tempered by the fact that a subsequent political
administration may choose to disclose information that is initially privi-
leged. Third, governmental employees have an affirmative duty to re-
port wrongdoing. This also lessens the governmental employee's expec-
tation of confidentiality.
The fourth reason for rejecting the attorney-client privilege for
governmental entities also supports limiting the work-product doctrine
for public entities. In the private corporate setting, the economic costs
of misfeasance and malfeasance provide an internal incentive for corpo-
rations to operate within economic and ethical norms and to make in-
ternal investigations. This economic incentive is missing in the govern-
mental context. The incentive for internal investigation and self-
correction for governmental entities is the political cost associated with
public disclosure of wrongdoing. Even temporarily denying the public
access to information reduces the incentive for responsible government.
In Edmark the court left the responsibility for protecting the in-
tegrity of the system and weighing the constitutional issues in the
hands of the trial courts. One possible way out of the government attor-
ney's dilemma is to seek an order from the court in which litigation is
pending, since the Act provides a specific exemption for documents pro-
tected by court order. The fact that the court found the City's failure
to appeal in the incinerator litigation important enough to mention
twice,'72 among the labyrinth of facts presented, may indicate that the
court will look favorably upon orders protecting litigation documents
from the Act.
After Edmark it seems safe to say that the court will not allow the
governmental entity to make any inquiry into the motives of the person
making a request for documents. The Freedom of Information Act
makes no provision for such inquiry 7 ' and, given the court's broad in-
terpretation of the Act, the court appears hostile to any attempt on the
part of a public agency to examine the motives of a requesting party.
This is particularly so in light of the court's refusal in Pickens and
Hope Brick Works, Inc. to allow agencies to use the statutory require-
172. 304 Ark. at 183, 191, 801 S.W.2d at 277, 281.
173. Watkins, supra note 30, at 762.
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ment of citizenship to block FOIA requests.17 4
Application of the Act to require disclosure of the files of attorneys
employed by public agencies can be expected to cause some problems.
Disclosure may sometimes even be adverse to the public interest. Obvi-
ously, the release of litigation files would benefit the opposing side in
the midst of litigation. Though the court in Edmark stated that the
increased chance of losing a trial did not constitute a deprivation of the
right to a fair trial, there must be some limit to this proposition. At
some point an increased chance of losing does constitute a deprivation
of the right to a fair trial. If disclosure increases the public entity's
chances of losing from fifty percent to ninety-nine percent, is it not
effectively being denied a fair trial? Along the same vein, would the
court require disclosure of litigation files if the City were facing crimi-
nal liability? Although its ruling may be correct, the court treated the
constitutional question in Edmark somewhat superficially.
Increasing the public entity's risk of losing will increase the en-
tity's potential financial liability in the short run. In the case of
Edmark, it is probable that the chief beneficiaries of any recovery from
the City's liability on the bonds would be institutional investors, who
are probably not the "public" that the Act was intended to protect.
Balanced against the detriment to the public interest is the very
important benefit of encouraging governmental accountability. The Act
calls the public's right to know "vital. ' 175 It has been argued that the
decisions of the Arkansas government often fail to benefit a majority of
its people.176 The Freedom of Information Act may address that criti-
cism and curb future governmental abuses. While compliance with the
Act may increase financial liabilities in the short run, these liabilities
should decrease in the long run as governmental abuses are deterred by
the threat of publicity. Open government requires more input into the
decision-making process, which provides more opportunities to identify
mistaken policies and programs before they are put into practice.
It is difficult to hold public officials accountable without access to
public information. The importance of public access to information is
amply illustrated by the'degrees to which the totalitarian governments
of the twentieth century have gone to limit it. Free information is nec-
essary for free government.
174. See Watkins, supra note 30, at 760-62.
175. ARK. CODE ANN. § 25-19-102 (1987).




Perhaps a balance could be struck by providing a temporary ex-
emption until the end of litigation for the types of legal memoranda
mentioned by Justice Turner. In Edmark the court concluded that even
if providing this type of exemption were desirable, it should be a ques-
tion for the legislature. 17 7 It should also be kept in mind that there is
the danger that any exemption might be used to swallow the entire
Act. The court seems to have taken the better approach. Trial courts
already have the authority to order the nondisclosure of documents if it
is necessary to ensure a fair trial. Even a temporary exemption for the
duration of the litigation might last for years, especially in complex
securities litigation such as that which could have developed around the
bonds in Edmark. Such delay might dampen the ability of the public to
hold its officials accountable.
James Madison wrote: "A Popular Government without popular
information, or the means of acquiring it is but a Prologue to a Farce
or a tragedy; or perhaps both. Knowledge will forever govern igno-
rance; and the people who mean to be their own Governors, must arm
themselves with the power which knowledge gives."" 8 In the modern
parlance, knowledge is power. In Edmark the court continued its string
of decisions keeping such power in the hands of the people through the
Arkansas Freedom of Information Act. Although there are valid argu-
ments to be made for maintaining the secrecy of the public attorney's
litigation files, the court's refusal to restrict the scope of the Act should
benefit the public interest in the long run.
Lawrence W. Jackson
177. 304 Ark. at 192, 801 S.W.2d at 282.
178. Letter from James Madison to W. T. Barry, August 4, 1822, in THE COMPLETE
MADISON 377 (Padover ed. 1953).
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